The rift among Iran's conservatives
The troops had about as much sympathy for the demonstrators as a small-town boy from Alabama might have for a Harvard postdoc. Failing to understand the social tensions in Iran, the reporters deluded themselves into thinking they were witnessing a general uprising. But this was not St. Petersburg in 1917 or Bucharest in 1989 — it was Tiananmen Square.
There is a crisis in the political elite, particularly among the clerics. But that crisis does not cut the way Western common sense would have it. Many of Iran’s religious leaders see Ahmadinejad as hostile to their interests, as threatening their financial prerogatives, and as taking international risks they don’t want to take. Ahmadinejad’s political popularity in fact rests on his populist hostility to what he sees as the corruption of the clerics and their families and his strong stand on Iranian national security issues.
The clerics are divided among themselves, but many wanted to see Ahmadinejad lose to protect their own interests. Khamenei, the supreme leader, faced a difficult choice last Friday. He could demand a major recount or even new elections, or he could validate what happened. Khamenei speaks for a sizable chunk of the ruling elite, but also has had to rule by consensus among both clerical and non-clerical forces. Many powerful clerics like Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani wanted Khamenei to reverse the election, and we suspect Khamenei wished he could have found a way to do it. But as the defender of the regime, he was afraid to. Mousavi supporters’ demonstrations would have been nothing compared to the firestorm among Ahmadinejad supporters — both voters and the security forces — had their candidate been denied. Khamenei wasn’t going to flirt with disaster, so he endorsed the outcome.
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jh64487
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this to some extent backs what you're saying but differs on the terms. for instance. you claim ahmadinejad supports gov reform against the mullahs but is it not equally likely that he's simply interested in obtaining more power for himself and because he is backed by the Guards khamenei has little ability to restrict him (outside of perhaps civil war).
this is very interesting, continue posting. wish we could chat face to face on this.
- 2 years ago
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jh64487
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jh64487
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So in a sense Ahmadinejad was pro-gov reform but a traditionalist in terms of international policies and cultural values whereas Mousavi was to some extent the opposite....hmm...yea i might buy that.
again...is the claim you're making is that Mousavi supports the power of the clerics while at the same time supporting a more moderate relationship with the west and a loosening of cultural restrictions?
spell this out for me, it's counter-intuitive.
- 2 years ago
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jh64487
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jh64487
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it's a well written intelligent article
this may actually be a factor in this...but is it the only or even prominent factor. hmm...
- 2 years ago
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jh64487
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jubal
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Well, lets hope that the division leads to the desolation of the oppressors.
- 2 years ago
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jubal
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Highr0ller [removed]
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Iran: A Rift Persists While Protests Dwindle
June 22, 2009
The division among the Iranian government's power brokers poses more of a threat to the Islamic Republic than the dwindling crowds of protesters in Tehran. - 2 years ago
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Highr0ller [removed]
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Highr0ller [removed]
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Tehran in 2009, however, was a struggle between two main factions, both of which supported the Islamic republic as it was. There were the clerics, who have dominated the regime since 1979 and had grown wealthy in the process. And there was Ahmadinejad, who felt the ruling clerical elite had betrayed the revolution with their personal excesses. And there also was the small faction the BBC and CNN kept focusing on — the demonstrators in the streets who want to dramatically liberalize the Islamic republic. This faction never stood a chance of taking power, whether by election or revolution. The two main factions used the third smaller faction in various ways, however. Ahmadinejad used it to make his case that the clerics who supported them, like Rafsanjani, would risk the revolution and play into the hands of the Americans and British to protect their own wealth. Meanwhile, Rafsanjani argued behind the scenes that the unrest was the tip of the iceberg, and that Ahmadinejad had to be replaced. Khamenei, an astute politician, examined the data and supported Ahmadinejad.
Now, as we saw after Tiananmen Square, we will see a reshuffling among the elite. Those who backed Mousavi will be on the defensive. By contrast, those who supported Ahmadinejad are in a powerful position. There is a massive crisis in the elite, but this crisis has nothing to do with liberalization: It has to do with power and prerogatives among the elite. Having been forced by the election and Khamenei to live with Ahmadinejad, some will make deals while some will fight — but Ahmadinejad is well-positioned to win this battle. - 2 years ago
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Highr0ller [removed]
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continued
he Western media misunderstood this because they didn’t understand that Ahmadinejad does not speak for the clerics but against them, that many of the clerics were working for his defeat, and that Ahmadinejad has enormous pull in the country’s security apparatus. The reason Western media missed this is because they bought into the concept of the stolen election, therefore failing to see Ahmadinejad’s support and the widespread dissatisfaction with the old clerical elite. The Western media simply didn’t understand that the most traditional and pious segments of Iranian society support Ahmadinejad because he opposes the old ruling elite. Instead, they assumed this was like Prague or Budapest in 1989, with a broad-based uprising in favor of liberalism against an unpopular regime.
- 2 years ago
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Highr0ller [removed]
