Obama's Peace Trip to Kabul? - PART II
......Continued from Obama's Peace Trip to Kabul? - PART I
•4. The Chinese Position:
The Chinese government may find it politically useful to have a stable Afghanistan in its south-west as has already been explained above.
•5. The Indian Position:
The Indian Establishment is quite famous for coming up with the funny and outdated foreign policy ideas. It was recently reported to have insisted on the desirability of only the REINTEGRATION and not the RECONCILIATION of the Taliban citing the absurd logic of these two concepts being invariably different. According to it, the Taliban may be encouraged to join the political mainstream, but not permitted to share the political power.
But, the reality is that these two concepts are mutually inter-related. The one without the other is totally meaningless, worthless and useless. This Indian confused-conceptuality has perhaps led to the continuance of the problems like the Naxalism and the NSCN, etc. in India.
The opposition political parties in India have on numerous occasions accused the current ruling Congress party in New Delhi of having used the Naxalites for political convenience in Andhra Pradesh without ever bothering about solving the Naxalism forever.
Ditto, Shibu Soren is accused of using the Naxals for political gains in Jharkhand. The part of the problem lies in the Indian attitude of not letting these forces have a share in political power. Wherever and whenever such forces were encouraged and given a chance to taste the political power, they ceased to be a political problem. For example, the student unrest in Assam in the North-East India led by the Asom Gana Sangram Parishad [AGSP] came to an end once the AGSP came to political power in Assam.
No doubt, here, one may argue that the AGSP and the Taliban are two entirely different cases with the former having been a democratic force with the later being a dogmatic and fundamentalist force having no respect for the democratic ethos. Partly t rue.
The other far bigger part of the reality is this: The Taliban was primarily created with the help of the partly democratic Pakistani Establishment and then remote controlled by the ISI. It's true that different officers of the ISI have been attacked by the Taliban at Peshawar, Lahore and Multan in the last year-and-a-half directly.
Again, this only represents the part-picture. It doesn't in any way means a loss of the full love between the Pakistani Establishment and the Taliban. Like in any organization, there are bound to be a few dissenting voices in the Taliban too. The attacks mentioned above seem to be the handiwork of this minority - the dissident voices within the Taliban.
Anyone who has worked in any worthy intelligence set-up shall tell you bluntly this perceptible truth: The Taliban can never be fully operational without at least some amount of support from the Pakistani Establishment. So, one may naturally conclude emphatically that the USA must be able to lead the Taliban to the Democratic path via effective influence over the Pakistani Establishment.
•6. The Taliban Position:
The Taliban has erroneously termed Obama's intentions to withdraw troops from Afghanistan as a weakness of the USA and a victory for the Taliban. The factual reality is that the USA is still a very powerful military machine. But, Obama has decided wisely to give the peace a chance in the region by announcing the American troop withdrawal.
The Taliban fails to realize that the claims of a victory only tend to weaken Obama's hands back at home with the opposition demanding for an indefinite stay of the American troops in Afghanistan. This in turn forces the Obama Administration to try to stay put in Afghanistan and be seen as winning the war and not losing it.
The Taliban leadership need understand and appreciate the genuineness of Obama's intentions to being peace in Afghanistan. It mustn't make Obama seem weak by declaring it a victory for the Taliban if the American troops are moved out of Afghanistan.
Just as Obama is trying to give peace a chance in Afghanistan, so should the Taliban elements and the Pakistani Establishment. The Taliban mustn't insist on the withdrawal of the foreign troops as a pre-condition for the reconciliation. The Taliban must renounce the violence, not be fooled by those trying to make it fight to the finish with the foreign troops, join the political mainstream and reconcile with the Hamid Karzai government.
Many valuable human lives were lost on all sides in the battle for Marja, Helmand with the Taliban beating a retreat. The same case-scenario is most likely to happen in the battle for Kandhar, too.
So, what is the Taliban or their handlers trying to manage? Is it to show that the Americans can't get away without paying a price in terms of the loss of lives of the American soldiers? Well, this is an absurd logic. Even the Taliban itself is losing precious human lives in terms of its cadres. Or is it that some of these handlers are trying to show that without mediation for a financial price paid by the White House to these handlers, the Taliban elements are unmanageable? Well, the USA is powerful enough not to get bullied into such tricks.
The Most Important Ramifications:
1. The surprise visit is likely to make Hamid Karzai understand better the heightened sense of the importance of Afghanistan in the mental geography of Obama and initiate instantly the Obama-Suggested-Remedial-Measures, especially now that he [Obama] has emerged relaxed fully from the major health insurance issue at the home.
2. It is likely to send a strong signal to the Pakistani Establishment to do its bit to help speed up the peace process in Afghanistan.
3. It is going to make the Taliban realize that the USA isn't going to run away from Afghanistan on a losing stand.
4. It is likely to be perceived as a measure of solidarity of Obama with the foreign troops battling the insurgents in Afghanistan.
5. The most important of all, it is likely to convince the rest of the world about the seriousness and genuineness of Obama as regards the quick restoration of the badly needed peace in Afghanistan and consequently may speed up the peace process in Afghanistan.
•4. The Chinese Position:
The Chinese government may find it politically useful to have a stable Afghanistan in its south-west as has already been explained above.
•5. The Indian Position:
The Indian Establishment is quite famous for coming up with the funny and outdated foreign policy ideas. It was recently reported to have insisted on the desirability of only the REINTEGRATION and not the RECONCILIATION of the Taliban citing the absurd logic of these two concepts being invariably different. According to it, the Taliban may be encouraged to join the political mainstream, but not permitted to share the political power.
But, the reality is that these two concepts are mutually inter-related. The one without the other is totally meaningless, worthless and useless. This Indian confused-conceptuality has perhaps led to the continuance of the problems like the Naxalism and the NSCN, etc. in India.
The opposition political parties in India have on numerous occasions accused the current ruling Congress party in New Delhi of having used the Naxalites for political convenience in Andhra Pradesh without ever bothering about solving the Naxalism forever.
Ditto, Shibu Soren is accused of using the Naxals for political gains in Jharkhand. The part of the problem lies in the Indian attitude of not letting these forces have a share in political power. Wherever and whenever such forces were encouraged and given a chance to taste the political power, they ceased to be a political problem. For example, the student unrest in Assam in the North-East India led by the Asom Gana Sangram Parishad [AGSP] came to an end once the AGSP came to political power in Assam.
No doubt, here, one may argue that the AGSP and the Taliban are two entirely different cases with the former having been a democratic force with the later being a dogmatic and fundamentalist force having no respect for the democratic ethos. Partly t rue.
The other far bigger part of the reality is this: The Taliban was primarily created with the help of the partly democratic Pakistani Establishment and then remote controlled by the ISI. It's true that different officers of the ISI have been attacked by the Taliban at Peshawar, Lahore and Multan in the last year-and-a-half directly.
Again, this only represents the part-picture. It doesn't in any way means a loss of the full love between the Pakistani Establishment and the Taliban. Like in any organization, there are bound to be a few dissenting voices in the Taliban too. The attacks mentioned above seem to be the handiwork of this minority - the dissident voices within the Taliban.
Anyone who has worked in any worthy intelligence set-up shall tell you bluntly this perceptible truth: The Taliban can never be fully operational without at least some amount of support from the Pakistani Establishment. So, one may naturally conclude emphatically that the USA must be able to lead the Taliban to the Democratic path via effective influence over the Pakistani Establishment.
•6. The Taliban Position:
The Taliban has erroneously termed Obama's intentions to withdraw troops from Afghanistan as a weakness of the USA and a victory for the Taliban. The factual reality is that the USA is still a very powerful military machine. But, Obama has decided wisely to give the peace a chance in the region by announcing the American troop withdrawal.
The Taliban fails to realize that the claims of a victory only tend to weaken Obama's hands back at home with the opposition demanding for an indefinite stay of the American troops in Afghanistan. This in turn forces the Obama Administration to try to stay put in Afghanistan and be seen as winning the war and not losing it.
The Taliban leadership need understand and appreciate the genuineness of Obama's intentions to being peace in Afghanistan. It mustn't make Obama seem weak by declaring it a victory for the Taliban if the American troops are moved out of Afghanistan.
Just as Obama is trying to give peace a chance in Afghanistan, so should the Taliban elements and the Pakistani Establishment. The Taliban mustn't insist on the withdrawal of the foreign troops as a pre-condition for the reconciliation. The Taliban must renounce the violence, not be fooled by those trying to make it fight to the finish with the foreign troops, join the political mainstream and reconcile with the Hamid Karzai government.
Many valuable human lives were lost on all sides in the battle for Marja, Helmand with the Taliban beating a retreat. The same case-scenario is most likely to happen in the battle for Kandhar, too.
So, what is the Taliban or their handlers trying to manage? Is it to show that the Americans can't get away without paying a price in terms of the loss of lives of the American soldiers? Well, this is an absurd logic. Even the Taliban itself is losing precious human lives in terms of its cadres. Or is it that some of these handlers are trying to show that without mediation for a financial price paid by the White House to these handlers, the Taliban elements are unmanageable? Well, the USA is powerful enough not to get bullied into such tricks.
The Most Important Ramifications:
1. The surprise visit is likely to make Hamid Karzai understand better the heightened sense of the importance of Afghanistan in the mental geography of Obama and initiate instantly the Obama-Suggested-Remedial-Measures, especially now that he [Obama] has emerged relaxed fully from the major health insurance issue at the home.
2. It is likely to send a strong signal to the Pakistani Establishment to do its bit to help speed up the peace process in Afghanistan.
3. It is going to make the Taliban realize that the USA isn't going to run away from Afghanistan on a losing stand.
4. It is likely to be perceived as a measure of solidarity of Obama with the foreign troops battling the insurgents in Afghanistan.
5. The most important of all, it is likely to convince the rest of the world about the seriousness and genuineness of Obama as regards the quick restoration of the badly needed peace in Afghanistan and consequently may speed up the peace process in Afghanistan.
